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ABSTRACT 
The coordination channel has been proposed as a means by which foreign 
exchange market intervention may be effective, in addition to the traditional 
portfolio balance and signaling channels. If strong and persistent misalignments of 
the exchange rate are caused by non-fundamental influences, such that a return to 
equilibrium is hampered by a coordination failure among fundamentals-based 
traders, then central bank intervention may act as a coordinating signal, 
encouraging stabilizing speculators to re-enter the market at the same time. We 
develop this idea in the framework of a simple microstructural model of exchange 
rate movements, which we then estimate using daily data on the dollar-mark 
exchange rate and on Federal Reserve and Bundesbank intervention operations. 
The results are supportive of the existence of a coordination channel of 
intervention effectiveness. 
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1 Introduction 
When monetary authorities engage in active exchange rate management, they do so by 
conducting occasional foreign exchange market interventions, which can be defined as sales 
or purchases of foreign currency in order to influence the future path of the exchange rate 
(Neely, 2000; Schwartz, 2000). It is common practice among central banks to sterilize the 
impact of foreign exchange market interventions on the monetary base (Taylor, 1992; 
Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Weber, 1994). Given that the impact of intervention on the 
domestic money supply is typically neutralized, the question arises as to how sterilized 
intervention can affect exchange rates. Since Mussa (1981), the academic literature has 
traditionally distinguished two channels through which sterilized intervention may be 
effective: the ‘signaling channel’ and the ‘portfolio balance channel’. However, the poor 
empirical evidence on both of these channels, as on traditional economic models of foreign 
exchange rate behaviour more generally, suggests that there may be other forces at play 
(Taylor, 1994, 2004, 2005; Sarno and Taylor, 2001).  
As a result, recent studies investigating the effectiveness of central bank intervention 
have increasingly made use of the market microstructure approach to exchange rates (Lyons, 
2001), where market makers’ adjustment of exchange rates depend on whether or not the 
order flow comes from informed traders (Mende et al., 2005). In these models, while order 
flow from informed traders is expected to change the exchange rate, uninformed traders’ 
activity does not affect market makers’ price-setting behavior. In addition, if the analysis is 
extended to a multiple dealer model, an informational asymmetry occurs between market 
makers (Lyons, 1997). Within this asymmetric information framework, central banks are 
perceived to be informed traders, implying that official intervention should alter exchange 
rates through a process of information dissemination. Empirical support for the market 
microstructure approach to intervention effectiveness is provided by Peiers (1997), who 
reports on the price leadership of Deutsche Bank, reputedly one of a small number of few   2
market makers used for the Bundesbank’s intervention operations. Given the available 
information technologies on financial markets, however, the dissemination of information 
through foreign exchange order flow may be a matter of just a few hours. From this point of 
view, it is not surprising that Dominguez (2003) finds the influence of Federal Reserve 
intervention to be concentrated in approximately the first three hours following the 
submission of the central bank’s order, with the exchange rate subsequently reverting to the 
pre-intervention level. In line with the propositions of the market microstructure approach, 
trading volume and new information on fundamentals both affect the sustainability of 
intervention operations, but generally not permanently. Applying event study methodology, 
Fatum and Hutchison (2003) provide limited support for the effectiveness of intervention, 
concluding that intervention may signal central banks’ views on the fundamental value of the 
exchange rate but cannot substitute for more fundamental policy actions.  
Given that neither the traditional transmission channels nor more recent approaches to 
central bank intervention appear to account for prolonged effects on exchange rates 
(prolonged, that is, beyond a few hours), a further channel of influence, the coordination 
channel, has been proposed (Taylor, 1994 2004, 2005; Sarno and Taylor, 2001), whereby 
central bank intervention may be seen as resolving a coordination failure in the foreign 
exchange market. Given the prevalence of non-fundamental influences in the foreign 
exchange market such as technical analysis, as well as the general heterogeneity and diversity 
of opinion even among traders basing their analysis on economic fundamentals (Allen and 
Taylor, 1990; Taylor and Allen, 1992; Cheung and Chin, 2001), there may be periods in 
which the exchange rate moves strongly and persistently away from the fundamental 
equilibrium level. Kilian and Taylor (2003), for example, sketch a simple model whereby 
technical or chartist traders, who base their forecasts on extrapolations, tend to dominate so 
long as the exchange rate is within the broad range of estimates provided by fundamentalists, 
since the latter group will be characterized by disagreements concerning directional as well as   3
point forecasts of the exchange rate while the exchange rate is within this range. Once the 
exchange rate moves outside the range of most fundamentalists’ estimates of the fundamental 
equilibrium, however, a consensus develops among fundamentalists concerning directional 
forecasts (e.g. they mostly agree that the currency is overvalued, even if they disagree as to 
the extent of the overvaluation).
1  At this point, however, since fundamentalists’ trades based 
on their own forecasts would have been extremely unprofitable in the immediate past, during 
which time the non-fundamentalist traders held sway, the fundamentalists will have lost either 
lost confidence, or lost credibility with their managers, or exhausted their liquidity, or all 
three (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This therefore deters fundamentalist traders from entering 
the market and trading on a fundamentals-based forecast, even though they know that if they 
were all to enter the market together, they would force a return of the exchange rate to a level 
consistent with fundamentals. In other words, the market suffers from a coordination failure 
(Howitt, 2003). The central bank, perceiving this situation, then enters the market and 
announces its intervention, effectively acting as a coordinating signal to the fundamentalists, 
who follow it into the market, returning the exchange rate to a level to a level consistent with 
the economic fundamentals.
2 This is the coordination channel of intervention effectiveness.  
The course of the US dollar during the 1980s can be viewed as a case study for the role 
of publicly announced intervention as a coordinating signal. A traditional interpretation of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals clearly reveals a drastically overvalued US dollar by the end of 
1984, yet it took a policy of concerted intervention, publicly announced at the Plaza 
Agreement of the G5 Finance Ministers in February 1985, to prick the irrational bubble 
                                                 
1 In the model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), a similar effect is created by assuming that there is an 
exchange rate band, determined by transactions costs in goods arbitrage, outside of which informed traders 
assume that the exchange rate will revert to its fundamental equilibrium but within which they forecast no 
change in the exchange rate (i.e. they assume a random walk in the level). 
2 Although they do not emphasis the role of central bank intervention as a coordinating signal, similar models of 
interaction between fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists (or, more generally, between informed and 
uninformed traders) have been proposed by Frankel and Froot (1987, 1990), Goodhart (1988), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and, more recently, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006).   4
(Frankel and Froot, 1986, 1990a, 1990b).  
Even if the role of the monetary authorities in providing a coordinating signal in the 
foreign exchange market seems clear, however, the question arises as to why a central bank 
should resort to interventions in the foreign exchange market rather than simply to a 
transparent communication and information policy in pursuing its coordinating strategy. 
There is, of course, nothing in the above reasoning that precludes central bankers using policy 
announcements in addition to intervention operations as a coordinating signal (as was the 
case, for example, with the 1985 Plaza Accord), but the question remains as to why 
intervention operations are necessary in addition to (or in place of) announcements. As with 
the signaling channel of intervention effectiveness, it has to be borne in mind that central 
banks may be beleaguered by credibility problems which can only be resolved by resorting to 
monetary policy actions such as interventions. Such actions underscore the fact that monetary 
authorities follow a policy of “putting their money where their mouth is” and stand ready to 
act on the intervention signal (Mussa, 1981). On the other hand, as central bank credibility 
and transparency increases, one would perhaps expect to see less reliance on intervention. 
From this perspective, given the Bank of England’s shift to a transparent policy of inflation 
targeting in 1992 and full independence in 1997, it is perhaps, not surprising that the UK 
authorities have not intervened over the past decade. On the other hand, while the newly 
established European Central Bank was seeking to establish its credibility, it is not surprising 
that it not infrequently resorted to intervention operations. 
 Using a Markov regime-switching model of the real exchange rate and intervention 
data from the Federal Reserve, the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan, Taylor (2004, 2005) 
provides some supporting evidence for the coordination channel of intervention effectiveness, 
showing that intervention operations increased the switching probability from the unstable to 
the stable state in the 1980s for dollar-mark and dollar-yen, and that the probability of an   5
intervention switching the exchange rate into the stable state increased with the size of the 
deviation of the exchange rate from the fundamentals-based equilibrium (based on purchasing 
power parity). In this paper, we use a more direct testing strategy to investigate empirically 
the coordination channel. First, we explicitly use a simple theoretical market microstructure 
framework to model the (smooth) transition between stable and unstable regimes, from which 
we develop an empirical model in which we find that the speed of mean reversion of the 
exchange rate does indeed slow as the exchange rate deviates from its equilibrium value until, 
when misalignment is sufficiently large, the system becomes locked in an unstable regime. 
Second, within this empirical framework, we investigate the role of reported intervention as a 
driving variable in the transition between the stable and unstable regimes.
3 We find that 
reported intervention does indeed appear to govern the transition between regimes, although it 
does not appear to influence the level of the exchange rate directly, while secret intervention 
operations appear to have no discernible effects. Our empirical results are therefore supportive 
of the existence of a coordination channel of intervention effectiveness. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our 
microstructural model of the foreign exchange market and of the coordination channel of 
intervention effectiveness, focusing on the order submission behavior of stabilizing 
speculators. In Section 3 we develop an empirical model, informed by our theoretical analysis 
and recent empirical work on nonlinear exchange rate adjustment. In the following section, 
we describe our daily data set on German mark-US dollar exchange rates, intervention and 
fundamentals, while in Section 5 we present our main empirical results concerning 
intervention effectiveness. In Section 6 we report the results of robustness checks on the 
                                                 
3 In contrast to Taylor (2004, 2005), we model daily exchange rate dynamics and so avoid averaging the 
effectiveness by cumulating intervention operations to a monthly frequency. In addition, the direction of 
intervention is considered---Taylor (2004, 2005) only considers the amount of intervention, regardless of 
direction. Considering the direction of investment is important because, for instance, central bank purchases of 
an overvalued currency may puzzle traders and may lead to a loss in confidence in fundamental analysis. As a 
result, our estimation strategy allows for investigating the influence of intervention using original intervention   6
empirical model. In particular, we examine whether intervention effectiveness operates via its 
effect on informed traders’ confidence in fundamentals (as the coordination channel suggests) 
or more directly, and whether only reported (as opposed to secret) interventions should affect 
exchange rates (as the coordination channel also suggests). In a final section, we make some 
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 
2 A Microstructural Model of the Coordination Channel 
To study the effectiveness of central bank intervention in the conceptual framework of the 
coordination channel, we assume that exchange rates are determined in an order-driven 
market populated by heterogeneous agents (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2006; De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi, 2005, 2006). Demand for currency is expressed in terms of market orders, i.e. 
traders ask for an immediate transaction at the best available price. All orders are filled by the 
market maker at an exchange rate that is shifted from the previous exchange rate by an 
amount that depends on the excess demand of traders (Kyle, 1985; Evans and Lyons, 2002). 
At first glance, the Kyle structure of the model may appear inappropriate because it posits a 
batched and centralized trading structure, whereas real-world foreign exchange markets are 
decentralized dealer markets (Sarno and Taylor, 2002). However, as Vitale (1999) points out, 
the batch structure may serve as a proxy for the prevailing lack of transparency.  
Assuming a log-linear price-impact function, the change in the exchange rate at time 
t+1 may be expressed as a function of net order flow from informed and uninformed trades, 
plus a noise term: 






t t D D a s s ε ,                                                                               (1) 
where  t s  is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate at time t, defined as the price of home 
currency in units of foreign currency, and  M a  is a positive reaction coefficient determined by 
                                                                                                                                                          
data without loss of information.    7
the market maker. 
I
t D  and 
U
t D  denote the net order flow from informed and uninformed 
speculators, respectively. The exchange rate depends on the net order flow from informed and 
uninformed speculators because the market maker does not observe them individually. Due to 
this trading protocol we may distinguish three sources of exchange rate variation. Firstly, the 
noise term 1 + t ε  captures publicly available information that directly affects the market maker´s 
price-setting decision. Secondly, public news may operate via induced order flow and thirdly, 
exchange rate variation may be caused by order flow that is unrelated to publicly available 
news. Evans and Lyons (2003) find that all three sources significantly account for observed 
exchange rate changes; in particular, they find at the daily frequency one third of the price 
variation from publicly available macro news seems to be directly and immediately 
incorporated, while two thirds are transmitted via order flow.
4  
Orders are submitted by risk-neutral speculators and depend on expected excess returns. 
Expected excess returns on foreign exchange markets consist of the expected change in the 
exchange rate and on the interest differential. When calculating expected exchange rate 
changes, however, speculators differ with respect to the information set upon which their 
expectations are conditioned. 
Orders from uninformed traders 
U
t D  are not derived from a mathematically well-
defined econometric or economic model and are perceived to be largely uninformative 
regarding the equilibrium value of the exchange rate that is consistent with the underlying 
economic fundamentals. Since such traders’ investment strategies are perceived to be a major 
source of systematic forecasting errors, the term “noise trader” has become a familiar 
description in the analysis of financial markets literature over the past two decades (Black, 
1986). In the Kyle model, uninformed traders complicate the market maker’s inference of the 
equilibrium value from the order flow, which, in contrast, allows informed traders to 
                                                 
4 Dominguez and Panthaki (2005) provide further supporting evidence on the relevance of all three sources of   8
camouflage their information-revealing orders. In real-world financial markets, uninformed 
traders may correspond to chartists or technical traders (Allen and Taylor, 1990; Sager and 
Taylor, 2006). Although there exists a remarkable number of different chartist or technical 
trading rules, these forecasting devices generally rely on historical exchange rates. Their 
practical importance is confirmed by the market survey studies of Allen and Taylor (1990), 
Taylor and Allen (1992) and Cheung and Chinn (2001), which reveal that up to 30% of 
traders are best characterized as technical traders. In addition, there is some evidence that 
technical traders may generate persistent risk-adjusted profits (Levich and Thomas, 1993; 
LeBaron, 1999; Qi and Wu, 2006). Given that an important element of technical trading relies 
on trend-following, extrapolative methods (Taylor and Allen, 1992), we model uninformed 








t i i b s s a D − + − = − ,                                                                   (2) 
where 
*
t i  and it represent the interest rates of foreign and home currency deposits, 
respectively. The parameter a
U is expected to be positive. The expected sign of  b
U, however, 
is not immediately clear. According to uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), the interest 
differential ) (
*
t t i i −  should be an unbiased predictor of the percentage change in the exchange 
rate,  () t t s s − +1 . Equivalently, given that covered interest rate parity (the condition that the 
interest differential is just equal to the forward premium) is known to hold closely, at least 
among eurodeposit interest rates (Taylor, 1987, 1989), UIP implies that the forward exchange 
rate should be an unbiased predictor of the spot rate. If uninformed traders believed in UIP, 
therefore, one would expect b
U  to be positive. However, the failure of UIP (equivalently, the 
failure of forward rate unbiasedness) is so well documented as to have established itself as a 
stylized fact (Froot and Thaler, 1990; Taylor, 1995), and it seems that, if anything, there is a 
                                                                                                                                                          
exchange rate changes.   9
tendency among traders to bet against UIP using various ‘forward-rate bias’ trading  strategies 
(Fabozzi, 2001; Rosenberg, 2003), which would suggest a negative sign for b
U.
5 Overall, 
therefore, the sign of this coefficient is ambiguous. 
Informed traders base their expectations about future exchange rate changes on an 
analysis of exchange rate fundamentals. In general, this boils down to the calculation of a 
time-varying long-run equilibrium value, ft say, towards which the exchange rate is expected 
to revert over time, although the weight attached to the deviation from fundamentals in 







t i i b s f w a D − + − = ,                                                                                     (3) 
where 
I a  is a positive reaction coefficient and wt determines the weight attached by informed 
speculators to deviations of the exchange rate from its fundamental equilibrium level, 0<wt<1. 
As before, the sign of the coefficient on the interest differential, 
I b , is ambiguous.  
According to equation (3), so long as wt>0, the actions of informed traders amount to 
stabilizing speculation in the sense that it will tend to drive the exchange rate towards its 
equilibrium value. The finite speed of adjustment 
I a  (for given wt) may be rationalized by the 
fact that informed traders are aware of the uniformed traders’ destabilizing influence on 
exchange rates (DeLong et al., 1990). Alternatively, informed traders may recognize that 
closing their open positions moves the exchange rate in the opposite direction and so the 
adjustment has to be gradual (Osler, 1998).  
Since the basis for the coordination channel of intervention effectiveness is the time-
varying influence of stabilizing speculation on exchange rates through its effect on informed 
traders’ confidence, the informed traders’ reaction coefficient 
I a  has to be adjusted by a 
variable wt ranging between zero and unity. In the following, we construct wt as a measure of 
speculators’ confidence in fundamental analysis as basis for their trades. 
                                                 
5 The act of buying high-interest rate currencies is also referred to in the markets as a ‘carry trade’—see e.g.   10
The precise notion of confidence that wt is designed to capture is worthy of further 
comment. Firstly, if the distance between the exchange rate and its equilibrium value 
increases, fundamental analysis wrongly predicts the sign of the exchange rate change. The 
gap  () t t s f −  may thus represent a temporary deviation exploitable for speculative purposes. 
However, if the exchange rate is trending away from the fundamental equilibrium, then 
traders face a fundamental risk (Figlewski, 1979) and betting against the trend may be 
associated with substantial losses. Informed traders thus become increasingly reluctant to 
submit orders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Conversely, if misalignments decrease, 
fundamental analysis delivers correct predictions and regains its popularity. The ability of 
current misalignments to signal shifts in the equilibrium value is diminished by noise. 
Misalignments from high-volatility (high signal-to-noise ratio) periods are less informative 
than those from low-volatility (low signal-to-noise ratio) periods (De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 
2006). It therefore seems reasonable to postulate that standardized absolute misalignment 
influences traders’ confidence. Secondly—and crucially from the point of view of the 
coordination channel—we allow the trading activity of central banks in the foreign exchange 
market to influence informed traders’ confidence in fundamental analysis. If a central bank 
sells a currency that is widely perceived to be overvalued, it reveals its commitment to a 
lower exchange rate. In the market microstructure literature, central banks are perceived to 
have superior information about the exchange rate’s fundamental value, because they observe 
innovations in fundamental data series in advance and are able to assess their impact on future 
exchange rate returns (Sager and Taylor, 2006). Informed traders then become more confident 
that the exchange rate will revert to its fundamental value and engage in trading. The market 
increasingly focuses on fundamentals, so interventions may be viewed as a device with which 
to coordinate traders’ expectations.  
As argued by Taylor (2004, 2005), the influence of intervention operations on traders’ 
                                                                                                                                                          
Galati and Melvin (2004).   11
confidence through the coordination channel should depend on the level of current 
misalignment. In the neighborhood of the fundamental value, the potential stabilizing gains of 
interventions should be negligible because informed traders will interpret small 
misalignments as temporary phenomena exploitable for speculative purposes and will trade 
intensively in the market. If the misalignment is large, however, intervention will tend to be 
more effective, because informed traders who have reduced their orders because of a loss in 
confidence in the fundamentals may by encouraged by the central bank intervention. Finally, 
it must be noted that buying an overvalued currency would puzzle informed traders and 
perhaps drive them out of the market. To capture these misleading signals, we set an indicator 
variable equal to –1 if the exchange rate is overvalued and equal to +1 if it is undervalued 
according to the measure of the fundamental equilibrium. Multiplying the indicator variable 
by the current sale or purchase provides us with an intervention measure (intt) that is positive 
only if the central bank operates in the appropriate direction. 
Following the above line of argument, informed traders’ confidence in the fundamentals 
can be expressed as a function of the standardized absolute misalignment and the intervention 






















− − = 2 1 ,                                                                                   (5) 
and where
S
t σ  denotes the conditional standard deviation of exchange rate movements. As 
central banks’ intervention operations will not be able completely to eliminate informed 
traders’ lack of confidence, we assume  t int 2 1 ϕ ϕ > , which means the value of  t c  lies on the 
interval (–∞, 0). A logistic normalization transforms the value ct into a confidence measure wt   12
ranging between 0 and 1.
 6  
Combining equations (1)−(5), the solution for the exchange rate emerges as  
() ( ) 1
*
1 1 ) ( + − + + − + − + − + = t t t t t t t t t t i i s f w s s s s ε γ δ α ,                                            (6)  
with  0 > =
U Ma a α ,0 > =
I Ma a δ , and  ) b b ( a
I U M + = γ , the sign of γ  being ambiguous. 
From equation (6) we can see that, for a given value of δ, informed traders’ stabilizing 
impact on the exchange rate increases nonlinearly with their confidence in fundamental 
analysis. If, for instance, the exchange rate is near its fundamental equilibrium value, 
informed traders provide maximum mean reversion, since wt will be close to unity. However, 
as the exchange rate becomes increasingly misaligned, informed traders reduce their orders 
and mean reversion weakens. This creates a role for central bank intervention which, though 
its coordinating influence on informed traders, effectively raises their confidence in the 
fundamentals and generates an increase in the degree of mean reversion of the nominal 
exchange rate towards the fundamental equilibrium. 
We now turn to empirical implementation of the model. 
3 The Empirical Model 
Our aim is to investigate empirically the role of central bank intervention through an 
investigation of the nonlinear theoretical exchange rate model outlined in the previous 
section. Our empirical model belongs to the STAR (Smooth Transition Autoregressive) 
family of models originally proposed by Ozaki (1985) and further developed and analyzed by 
Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992), Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994).  STAR 
models allow an economic variable to follow a given number of regimes, with switches 
between regimes achieved in a smooth and continuous fashion and governed by the value of a 
particular variable or group of variables. The STAR framework has previously proved 
                                                 
6 The logistic form of (4) was suggested by the switching mechanism of Brock and Hommes (1997) and Lux 
(1998) and is in the spirit of recent work by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006), who develop a similar   13
successful in applications to exchange rate behavior (Taylor and Peel, 2000; Taylor et al., 
2001; Kilian and Taylor, 2003).
7  
In order to examine the empirical evidence of the market microstructure model we shall 
use daily data, implying that the conditional variance of exchange rate returns cannot be 
treated as constant over time. To cope with the heteroskedastic properties of daily exchange 
rate returns, we therefore apply the STAR-GARCH procedure originally developed by 
Lundbergh and Teräsvirta (1998) and applied by Gallagher and Taylor (2001) and Reitz and 
Westerhoff (2003). The STAR-GARCH model consists of a mean equation containing a 
smooth transition function and a standard GARCH(1,1) volatility equation. In the present 
context, given the theoretical model outlined above, this suggests an empirical model of the 
form:  
() ( ) t t t t t d t t d t d t t t t i i s f h s f w s s ε γ ϕ δ α + − + − − + ∆ = ∆ − − − − − − − − − ) ( ; int ; ; 1
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1 t 2
2
1 t 1 0 t h h − − + + = β ε β β ,                                                                                         (9) 
where  ∆ is the first-difference operator,  ( ) 2 1 ϕ ϕ ϕ , = ,  t t t h ⋅ =ν ε  and 
iid
t ν ~N(0,1). The 
major differences between the empirical model (7)-(9) and the theoretical model set out in the 
previous section thus lies in our introduction of a GARCH model to capture the conditional 
standard variance of the error term and in an allowance for a delay in the influence of 
standardized misalignment on the confidence measure  ( ) d t t d t d t t h ; int ; s f ; w − − − − − 1 ϕ . This 
                                                                                                                                                          
switching function in their model of chartist-fundamentalist interaction. 
7 De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2001) apply a quadratic specification to model deviations of the exchange rate from 
fundamental equilibrium, which can be interpreted as an approximation to a STAR specification.   14
confidence measure is itself bounded between zero and unity. It depends on the sign and 
magnitude of interventions (intt) as well as on a standardized measure of the perceived 
deviation from the fundamental equilibrium,  d t d t d t h / s f − − − − , where the conditional 
standard deviation in (5) is explicitly modeled in (9) as a GARCH(1,1) process, ie. 
t
S
t h = σ .  
We allow in our empirical model for a value of the delay parameter, d, different from 
one since the importance of searching for an appropriate value of the delay parameter in 
empirical applications of STAR models has been stressed by Teräsvirta and others (e.g. 
Teräsvirta and Anderson, 1992; Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993; Teräsvirta, 1994). In our 
empirical implementation, it turns out, however, that a value of the delay parameter of unity 
was in fact selected, exactly consistent with our theoretical model.  
4 Data 
We use daily spot US dollar exchange rates against the Deutsche Mark (DM) to 
calculate percentage exchange rate returns as  t s ∆ ⋅ 100 . The price of one US dollar is 
expressed in German marks. In terms of the preceding discussion, therefore, the US is taken 
as the home economy and Germany as the foreign economy. The home interest rate is thus 
US
t i , the overnight US dollar eurodeposit interest rate, and the foreign interest rate is 
DM
t i , the 
overnight eurodeposit DM interest rate.  
We assume that the fundamental equilibrium value of the exchange rate, ft, can be 
adequately described by a measure of the purchasing power parity (PPP) level, based on 
relative consumer prices. Takagi (1991) provides evidence from survey data that foreign 
exchange market participants accept PPP as a valid relationship in the long run and that 
estimates of the PPP level are frequently taken as an indication of “fair value” (Rosenberg,   15
2003).  This view is also supported by recent research that suggests that the exchange rate 
reverts to the PPP level, but only in the long run (Rogoff, 1996).
8 Furthermore, PPP as a 
measure of the fundamental exchange rate ft seems to be suited to investigate central bank 
intervention, because monetary authorities have in the past used it as a target level 
(Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Neely, 2002, 2005a). Monthly observations of consumer 
price indices (CPIs) for the US and Germany were taken from the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics database to construct a measure of the PPP 




t CPI CPI log log − . A problem in applying this measure to an 
empirical model involving daily data is that observations on the consumer price indices are 
only available at the monthly frequency. Accordingly, we transformed the PPP fundamental 
series to daily frequency by taking the latest published value of the CPI indices as valid for 
the entire following month, which seems to be compatible with the information environment 
of a market participant in a daily trading context.
9 The PPP fundamental was normalized to be 
equal to the nominal exchange rate at the beginning of January 1990, although we effectively 
relaxed this normalization by allowing a shift parameter θ in our estimations, such that ft = 
pppt – θ. The estimated value of θ was, however, in no case significantly different from zero 
at the five percent level, and so we omitted it in our final estimations.  
Daily log exchange rates and our measure of the PPP fundamental are represented in 
the upper panel of Figure 1. 
 [Figure  1] 
                                                 
8 There is strong evidence, moreover, that this mean reversion may be nonlinear (Taylor and Peel, 2000; Taylor 
et al., 2001; Kilian and Taylor, 2003). 
9  To check whether or not the estimation results are driven by this simplifying assumption we experimented 
with linearly interpolated data. However, the estimation results do not change significantly.    16
With the monetary tightening under the Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, the rise in 
US interest rates increased the relative attractiveness of dollar assets from the perspective of 
global investors in the early part of our sample. Subsequently, the US dollar experienced a 
real appreciation that was accompanied by growing current account imbalances. From mid-
1984 to early 1985, the US dollar gained another 20 percent, even though the interest 
differential started to decline. This prompted the widespread conclusion that the US dollar 
was following a bubble-path and policy makers started to rethink the merits of flexible 
exchange rates. The upward trend of was effectively reversed when finance ministers and 
central bank governors decided at the Plaza Hotel in September 1985 to bring down the 
dollar.  
We use Federal Reserve and Bundesbank intervention data in order empirically to 
investigate the coordination channel. As can be seen in the lower panels of Figure 1, 
interventions by both the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank were sporadic and clustered 
over the sample period. The percentage of trading days in which intervention occurred is 
0.134 for the Federal Reserve and 0.249 for the Bundesbank, respectively. The average 
Federal Reserve intervention was –2.1 million dollars, indicating a near balance between 
purchases and sales. In contrast, the Bundesbank sold dollars in this period, the average 
intervention being DM – 26.56 million. Conditional on the occurrence of intervention, the 
mean absolute value of purchases or sales is US$ 112.1 million of the Federal Reserve and 
DM 158.3 million of the Bundesbank. Our sample ends at December 1992, because there was 
little intervention activity during the Clinton administration. 
5 Estimation Results 
The modeling procedure for building STAR models was carried out as suggested by Granger 
and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994). First, linear autoregressive models were   17
estimated in order to choose the lag order of the autoregressive term on the basis of the Bayes 
Information Criterion criterion. We found that first-order autocorrelation seemed to be 
appropriate for exchange rate returns in our data. Second, we tested linearity against the 
STAR model for different values of the delay parameter d, using the linear model (wt = 1, for 
all t) as the null hypothesis and choosing the value of d that gives the smallest marginal 
significance level (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993).
10 The transition parameters ϕ1 and ϕ2 are 
slope parameters that determine the speed of transition between the two extreme regimes, 
with low absolute values resulting in slower transition. Since (8) is a linear transformation of 
the standard logistic transition function as proposed by Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992), 
robust standard errors may be derived. This is important because conditional normality cannot 
be maintained. Under fairly weak regularity conditions, however, the resulting robust 
estimates are consistent even when the conditional distribution of the residuals is non-normal 
(Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992). Teräsvirta (1994) points out that estimating the transition 
parameters ϕi may cause particular problems such as slow convergence of the estimation 
routine or overestimation, and suggest setting the initial value of the transition parameter 
equal to the reciprocal of the sample variance of the transition variable in the iterative 
estimation procedure. However, the recommended rescaling of the transition variable by 
means of the conditional standard deviation has already been introduced for theoretical 
reasons. On the basis of this standardization, we therefore set ϕ1 = 1 and ϕ2 = 0 as the starting 
values for the estimation routine. Table 1 contains our final estimation results. 
  [Table 1]  
The estimation results are pleasing in the sense that the point estimates of the 
coefficients are significantly different from zero and appropriately signed and the estimated 
                                                 
10 Checking the standardized residuals of the model reveals that setting d = 1 passes the test for no remaining 
nonlinearity up to ten lags using the specification test of Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996).   18
model passes a number of diagnostic checks for remaining serial correlation, nonlinearity or 
conditional heteroscedasticity in the standardized residuals. 
We also tested the model against a restricted model in which δ = γ = ϕ1 =ϕ2 =0, so that 
the constrained model became a simple AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model. The resulting test 
statistic, LRT, is reported in Table 1, and reveals that the simple AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model is 
rejected against our STAR-GARCH model at the one percent significance level.  
Although, the point estimates of the uninformed trader and informed trader coefficients 
accord with our theoretical priors, the significantly negative point estimate of the interest rate 
differential coefficient implies—on average—an appreciation of the dollar if US interest rates 
are higher than German interest rates. Given our discussion of the likely sign of the 
coefficients b
U and 
I b  in Section 2, however, this is not surprising.   
Statistically significant point estimates of  1 ϕ  indicate moderate transition between 
regimes with respect to the standardized misalignment. The interpretation in terms of our 
model is straightforward. If the exchange rate converges towards the PPP value—as predicted 
by fundamental analysis—informed traders gain confidence in fundamental analysis and trade 
more heavily in the market. But, the more the exchange rate deviates from PPP, the more 
reluctant informed traders are to submit speculative orders. These related dynamics are 
represented in Figure 2, where the percentage deviation of the exchange rate from the PPP 
fundamental and the implied simulated mean reversion parameter are plotted from January 
1980 to December 1992.
11  
[Figure 2] 
                                                 
11 The simulated mean reversion parameter is calculated as ρ = δwt⋅100.   19
Figure 2 shows that the strong appreciation of the dollar starting in the early 1980s is 
associated with a significant decline of the mean reversion parameter. The upward trend of the 
exchange rate is reversed in 1985 when the mean reversion parameter reaches its lowest level. 
The statistically significant parameter ϕ2 indicates that an intervention operation 
compensated for the lack of confidence caused by exchange rate misalignments. The numbers 
suggest that at the average level of exchange rate volatility, a 20% misalignment results in a 
daily mean reversion towards fundamentals of 0.24%, or well in excess of 1% on a weekly 
basis. Under these circumstances an intervention operation of US$ 200 million increases the 
mean reversion parameter to 0.5%. The doubling of mean reversion by a slightly larger than 
average intervention operation indicates an economically significant contribution by the 
Federal Reserve. From the model’s perspective, Federal Reserve interventions encouraged 
agents to engage in fundamental speculation, thereby helping to bring the exchange rate back 
to the PPP level. In line with the analysis of Taylor (2004, 2005) the stabilizing influence of 
intervention increases as the real exchange rate moves away from its equilibrium level and 
misalignment grows. Using the above numbers, a US$ 200 million intervention increases 
mean reversion from 0.76% to 0.86% if the misalignment is 5% and from 0.04% to 0.19% if 
the misalignment is 40%.  
Although this degree of reversion of the exchange rate towards fundamentals may seem 
small, put into the context of the empirical literature on exchange rate adjustment it is, in fact, 
very high, especially when one notes that they are expressed on a daily basis. Rogoff (1996), 
for example, notes that linear estimates of the speed of adjustment of the real exchange rate 
towards its mean imply half-lives of three to five years, or  21% to 13% per annum.  The 
differences in the estimated speeds of adjustment in the studies surveyed by Rogoff (1996) 
and the present estimates may be reconciled by noting that mean reversion in our model is 
time-varying and nonlinear, and also that the model predicts substantial periods of   20
misalignment. 
Overall, therefore, our estimation results therefore provide strong support for the idea 
that intervention operations may stabilize exchange rates by coordinating stabilizing 
speculation based on exchange rate fundamentals.  
6 Robustness Checks 
6.1 Is the nonlinear effect of intervention on informed traders’ confidence in the fundamentals 
crucial? 
The logic of the coordination channel emphasizes the role of central bank intervention as a 
coordinating device for stabilizing speculation, which we have detected via its influence on 
the confidence that informed traders place in the economic fundamentals as a guide to their 
trades. However, via the more traditional signaling or portfolio balance channels, 
interventions may have a more direct impact on exchange rates. In order to distinguish 
between these two routes of effectiveness, and as a robustness check on our model of the 
coordination channel, we tried re-estimating the model with the impact of intervention on 
speculators’ confidence removed (i.e. setting ϕ2=0) and introducing the intervention variable 
directly as an explanatory variable into the mean equation. The exact specification of the 
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where figures in parentheses indicate asymptotic t-ratios. These results reveal that the 
estimated coefficients as well as their significance levels do not change substantially when 
interventions are introduced in the mean equation instead of driving informed traders’ 
confidence. More importantly, estimation of this model reveals no statistically significant 
impact of exchange rate interventions on exchange rates. This suggests that chief impact of 
intervention on exchange rate movements was via the coordination channel, and also accords 
with Neely’s (2005b) conjecture that explicitly allowing for the nonlinearity of intervention 
may be crucial in identifying its effects.  
 
6.2 Reported versus secret intervention 
The fact that the coordination channel of intervention effectiveness requires operations to be 
publicly available information provides us with a second robustness check. Officially, both 
Federal Reserve and Bundesbank intervention operations were conducted anonymously over 
the sample period. However, as Dominguez (2003) points out, central banks maintain 
relationships with traders allowing them to inform the entire market of their operations within 
minutes of the original call. Smith and Madigan (1988) quote Federal Reserve officials thus: 
“Most operations are conducted in the brokers’ market, though at the beginning of a major 
intervention episode we have sometimes chosen to deal directly with several banks 
simultaneously to achieve maximum visibility.” 
While the dissemination of intervention information via interdealer traders comes close to an 
official announcement, monetary authorities can also intervene secretly by placing orders on   22
the broker market. To what extent central banks allowed operations to be publicly available 
information is an empirical issue. Investigating the empirical evidence on the accuracy of 
press reports of foreign exchange intervention, Klein (1993) finds that in the case of the 
Federal Reserve the likelihood of intervention actually occurring given that it was reported by 
the press was 88 percent. Moreover, the likelihood of intervention being reported increased 
with the size of the operation. Thus, Federal Reserve interventions may be regarded as largely 
publicly available information in the foreign exchange market. In contrast, the number of 
reported interventions is significantly smaller in case of the Bundesbank. Only 46 out of 286 
operations conducted in the period between November 1982 and December 1984 were 
reported by the press (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). Thus, Bundesbank intervention 
operations may be regarded largely as secret.  
The fact that Federal Reserve interventions appeared to have been publicly available 
information (qualitatively if not quantitatively), while the Bundesbank appeared to have 
intervened in secret, allows us to conduct an interesting robustness check on our model of the 
coordination channel. Clearly, for intervention to be effective through the coordiantion 
channel, it must be publicly announced. Thus, substituting Bundesbank for Federal Reserve 
intervention data in our empirical model should result in an insignificant estimate of the 
influence of the intervention on informed traders’ confidence in fundamentals. We therefore 
re-estimated the model using Bundesbank intervention data, and obtained the following 
results:  
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Interestingly, the parameter estimates as well as the significance levels of the mean 
equation generally remain in the same range as before. The introduction of the Bundesbank 
intervention data slightly distorts the estimation of the transition variable, however. Even 
though the parameter ϕ1 is still correctly signed and of reasonable magnitude, it is no longer 
statistically significant. More importantly, however, we find that the parameter of the 
intervention measure is statistically insignificant. Bundesbank operations are obviously 
unable to improve traders’ confidence in fundamental analysis, exactly as predicted by the 
coordination channel.  
 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have developed and estimated a microstructural model of daily exchange 
rate behavior in order to study the effectiveness of Federal Reserve interventions in the 
German mark-US dollar foreign exchange market, and in particular to examine the relevance 
of the coordination channel of intervention effectiveness. Within our model, mean reversion 
of the exchange rate is provided by stabilizing speculation of informed trader traders, yet their 
foreign exchange market activity depends on their confidence in fundamental analysis. 
Parameter estimates reveal that the further removed the exchange rate is from the fundamental 
value, the weaker becomes informed traders’ trading activity. This nonlinearity provides the 
basis for the coordinating role of central bank intervention. According to the coordination 
channel, intervention operations may stabilize exchange rates by coordinating stabilizing 
speculation of informed traders, reflected as a sudden rise in confidence of the informed 
traders in fundamental analysis. Here, the fundamental value of the exchange rate is   24
approximated by purchasing power parity, implying that intervention effectiveness is assessed 
by testing whether intervention operations tend to induce stability in the real exchange rate. In 
line with the results of Taylor (2004, 2005), our empirical analysis provide evidence in favor 
of this route of intervention effectiveness. In particular, it was shown that the Federal 
Reserve’s intervention policy tended to reduce misalignments of the mark-dollar exchange 
rate in a manner consistent with the coordination channel. In addition, the ability of 
intervention operations to stabilize exchange rates improved as exchange rate distortions 
grew, while in the neighborhood of purchasing power parity intervention appeared to be less 
effective.  
Reestimating the model with the intervention variable directly affecting the exchange 
rate, rather than view its influence on traders’ confidence in the fundamentals, or using data 
on secret Bundesbank interventions, yielded statistically insignificant parameter estimates, as 
predicted by the coordination channel of intervention effectiveness.  
Our results may be interpreted as an explanation of why central banks continue to 
pursue sterilized intervention despite the prevailing skepticism in academia concerning its 
effectiveness.
12 The nonlinear dynamics on foreign exchange markets seem to allow for 
intervention effectiveness via a coordination of stabilizing speculation. These effects are 
likely to be absent from the standard linear time-series approaches applied in previous 
contributions. From a policy perspective, the results suggest a stabilizing role for intervention, 
but do not provide a basis for an intensive exchange rate management. 
 
                                                 
12 Indeed, an implicit belief in the coordination channel appears to form an important part of policy makers’ 
views on intervention—see, e.g. Wadhwani (2000).   25
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Table 1 
Parameter estimates of the STAR model 
(in percent) 1980.01.02 – 1992.12.31 
γ  – 3.75 (3.07)
*** 
α  0.03  (1.97)
** 
δ  0.01 (4.36)
*** 
ϕ1  0.05 (2.69)
*** 
ϕ2  0.11 (2.03)
** 
β0  0.014  (4.34)
*** 
β1  0.075 (7.19)
*** 
β2  0.899 (72.20)
*** 








Notes: The sample contains daily observations of the dollar spot 
exchange rate against the DM from January 1980 to December 1992. α, 
δ, γ, ϕ indicate the estimated parameters of the mean equations, β0, β1, 
and  β2 are the estimated GARCH(1,1) parameters, LLh is the log 
likelihood value and LRT the likelihood ratio test statistic with 
restrictions α = δ = ϕ = 0. AR(p) denotes the p-value for the Ljung-Box 
statistic for serial correlation of the residuals up to p lags. ARCH(q) 
denotes the p-value for the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation of 
the standardized squared residuals up to q lags. NRNL is the lowest   
p-value for no remaining nonlinearity up to ten lags. t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust estimates of the covariance matrices of 
the parameter estimates. 
* (
**, 
***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 
1%) level. 
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Fig. 1. Log US dollar spot rate, PPP fundamental, and central bank  intervention   32
 






































Fig. 2. Deviation of the spot rate from PPP and simulated mean reversion coefficient   
 